Abstract

In a participatory democracy where every vote counts, voters expect that every vote will be counted. The voting machine is the instrument with which the voting public records its intent and appoints its representatives. In order for the democratic process to function, voting machines must properly function.

Do electronic voting systems that rely on touchscreens work better at reducing undervote and overvote counts than optical scan systems? To answer this question, an analysis of undervote and overvote counts in the 2002 and 2006 Florida Gubernatorial elections was conducted. The undervote and overvote counts across county, voting system, system manufacturer, and election cycle were compared. Mean comparison analyses suggest that counties that primarily used touchscreen technology on Election Day had lower voter error rates than counties using optical scan technology in the 2006 election. Touchscreen technology is associated with less overvoting. Overall, voter error rates were found to be higher in the 2006 election than in the 2002 election for optical scan ballots but not for touchscreen systems.

Introduction

This paper examines voter error across Florida’s 67 counties in the 2002 and 2006 gubernatorial elections in order to analyze and explain any changes in voter error as represented by undervotes and overvotes across electronic voting systems. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) established a program to provide states with funds to replace punch card voting systems following the 2000 elections. Many argue that some voters were disenfranchised due to poorly designed voting equipment that year (Agresti and Presnell, 2002; Herron and Sekhon, 2003).  HAVA passage prompted the enactment of many state laws to facilitate its implementation.

HAVA was meant to re-establish voter confidence in the democratic process. Elections are one of the most important institutions in a participatory democracy. In a system where every vote should count, voters expect that every vote will be counted.  The voting machine is the instrument with which the voting public records its intent and appoints its representatives. In order for the democratic process to function, voting machines must properly function. Voting systems that are associated with lower voter error ensure public confidence. The integrity of the democratic process is based on the reliability, accuracy and verifiability of voting systems and low voter error is an indictor of these factors.  

Florida Statutes (F. S.) (Section 101.595) mandate that each county Supervisor of Elections report the total number of undervotes and overvotes in the first race that appears on an election ballot to the Florida Department of State. Pursuant to F.S. Section 97.021, an overvote means that a voter designates more than one answer to an office or ballot question while an undervote shows that no choice is properly designated for an office or ballot question. In either case, a vote is not recorded for that office or ballot question. 
F.S. Section 102.141 mandates a manual recount if a candidate is defeated or eliminated by one-half of one percent or less of the total votes cast for that office.  However, if the number of undervotes, overvotes, and provisional ballots is fewer than the number of votes needed to change the election outcome, a recount may not be ordered. In races where the outcome may be determined by just a few hundred votes, the need to reduce error is apparent.

Recent history shows Florida’s election process to be contentious and marked with controversy (Yang and Gaines, 2004). Hanging, pregnant, and dimpled chads in the 2000 election, coupled with the more recent incidence of high undervoting in the Congressional District 13 race where a recount was rendered impossible due to the lack of a verified voter paper trail for touchscreen systems (Wegner, 2007), has resulted in growing concerns over the reliability and lack of transparency in touchscreen voting systems.  The Florida legislature passed H.B. 537, which requires that all voting be by marksense ballot (optical scan ballot) with exceptions for disabled persons.  This law, which takes effect on January 1, 2008, will reduce the total number of counties using touchscreen machines to 14 while it brings the total number of counties with voter-verified paper record legislation (VVPR) to 30. Twenty counties do not require VVPR (including the 14 that still use touchscreens).  My findings may be applicable to those 14 counties that continue using touchscreen systems.

The electronic voting systems used in Florida for the 2002 and 2006 elections were based either on optical scan or on touchscreen technologies. These machines were manufactured by one of three companies: Election Systems & Software (ES&S), Diebold, or Sequoia. Following the 2002 elections, only one county made changes to its voting system: Baker County switched from Sequoia Optech to Diebold Marksense systems (Florida Department of State: Division of Elections, 2003). These two systems use the same optical scan technology but are produced by different manufacturers. In the 2006 election cycle, 11 counties used ES&S iVotronic systems software while four counties used Sequoia EDGE systems. These systems are touchscreen-based direct-recording electronic voting systems (DRE). Counties using touchscreen systems also provided optical scan ballots to absentee voters.

In the 2006 election cycle, 31 counties used Diebold Accuvote systems, 14 counties used ES&S M100 systems, and seven counties used ES&S Optech systems (Florida Department of State: Division of Elections, 2007), all of which use optical scan technology.  These counties supplemented their optical scan systems with touchscreen systems for both early and Election Day voting in order to accommodate voters with special needs in accordance with HAVA.

HAVA established federal standards for voting systems used in federal elections. These same systems are used in Florida’s elections, resulting in federal election standards impacting state races. HAVA requires that voting systems be accessible for individuals with disabilities in a manner that provides them with the same access and participation afforded to other voters. HAVA also requires that at least one direct recording electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities be present at each polling place.

Fifty-two of sixty-seven counties used optical scan systems in the 2002 election cycle. Of these, 51 counties used the same provider in 2002 and 2006. All 15 touchscreen counties used the same provider in 2002 and 2006. The technology used in Florida counties from 2002 to 2006 stayed constant, with the exceptions of the introduction of touchscreen systems to supplement the optical scan systems in 52 counties, the provider change in Baker County, and ballot design changes made by individual counties.  The statistical comparison of under- and overvotes in the empirical analyses is facilitated by so many counties using the same system across elections. 

Touchscreen systems are programmed to prevent overvoting while they notify voters when they have undervoted or skipped a ballot item. Optical scan paper ballots rely on voters to check their own ballot for errors. Counties using precinct tabulation systems can tabulate votes immediately and notify voters of any errors, who may then recast their votes using a new ballot. Lower overvoting resulted in both the 2002 and 2006 elections when compared with previous election cycles (Knack and Kropf, 2003). However, such tabulation systems are an incomplete safeguard, as counties using optical scan systems still have some tabulation error resulting from Election Day overvoting. 

Focusing on gubernatorial elections provides a standardized variable for measuring voter error. Lower level races may be affected by voter roll-off (Darcy and Schneider, 1989), with voters abstaining from voting in those races listed toward the end of the ballot. The gubernatorial race was first on the ballot for both 2002 and 2006 for all counties. Roll-off effects should have the least impact on the gubernatorial race, allowing for a more accurate comparison of the effects of voting technology on voter error across counties.

In this paper, undervote and overvote counts are compared by election cycle and by county to analyze trends in voter or tabulation error across voting technologies. The error rate for absentee ballots is also compared across counties and election cycles.

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